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I.   INTRODUCTION 
 On November 22, 1963, one airplane flight changed the course of 
Central Florida—and in many ways the entire nation.1 Aboard the 
plane was Walter Elias Disney,2 the creative genius who had ushered 
in a new era of American entertainment through his animated fea-
                                                                                                                     
 ∗. Chad D. Emerson is an Associate Professor of Law at Faulkner University Tho-
mas Goode Jones School of Law. He thanks his research assistant, Davy Hay, for his sup-
port with this Article as well as Ray Maxwell, who serves as the lead administrator for the 
Reedy Creek Improvement District. 
 1. See RICHARD E. FOGLESONG, MARRIED TO THE MOUSE 14 (2001). 
 2. Id. 
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tures and Disneyland theme park in Anaheim, California. From his 
window seat, Disney looked down on acreage of undeveloped land,3 
including rural swampland and citrus groves4—a physical environ-
ment that hardly seemed ripe for what would soon become one of the 
largest private developments in the United States. Yet, as was his 
skill, Disney saw an opportunity where others did not—so much so 
that a small team of Disney confidants soon began acquiring 27,000 
of these isolated acres for what would ultimately become the iconic 
Walt Disney World Resort.5 
 This Article analyzes the legal and regulatory events that enabled 
Disney’s vision to become a reality. This series of events uniquely 
melded public governance with private enterprise to create a system 
designed to facilitate Disney’s massive project without resorting to a 
large public investment. 
 Indeed, when the Florida Legislature created the Reedy Creek 
Improvement District (the “District” or “Reedy Creek” or “Improve-
ment District”), it empowered the District with authority “typically 
reserved for municipal and county governments.”6 The Legislature 
accomplished this through use of a special district.7 While Reedy 
Creek was certainly not the first special district, Disney’s version 
was unique in the broad scope of its authority. 
 This Article examines the history of special districts generally and 
the Reedy Creek Improvement District specifically. It then analyzes 
the positive benefits that both Disney and the general public have 
realized since the Florida Legislature empowered the District with 
authority normally vested in public governments. In doing so, the Ar-
ticle concludes that under certain circumstances, such as the case at 
hand, granting public powers to private parties can result in a more 
effective and efficient method of governing. 
 This is the lesson—and the story—of the Reedy Creek Improve-
ment District. 
II.   PRIVATIZING TRADITIONAL PUBLIC AREAS OF GOVERNANCE 
 Historically, most regulatory functions in this country have been 
divided among the federal, state, and local governments. However, 
since the World War II era, another form of government—the special 
                                                                                                                     
 3. See Robert N. Jenkins, How One Man, and One Mouse, Changed Us, ST. 
PETERSBURG TIMES, Dec. 12, 1999, http://www.sptimes.com/News/121299/news_pf/Travel/ 
How_one_man__and_one_.shtml. 
 4. STEVE MANNHEIM, WALT DISNEY AND THE QUEST FOR COMMUNITY 68 (2002). 
 5. FOGLESONG, supra note 1, at 46. 
 6. OFFICE OF PROGRAM POLICY ANALYSIS & GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY, FLA. LEG., 
CENTRAL FLORIDA’S REEDY CREEK IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT HAS WIDE-RANGING AUTHORITY, 
Rep. No. 04-81, at 3 (2004) [hereinafter REEDY CREEK IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT REPORT]. 
 7. See id. 
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district—has grown increasingly popular.8 The United States Census 
Bureau defines special districts as follows: 
Special district governments are independent, special-purpose go-
vernmental units (other than school district governments), that ex-
ist as separate entities with substantial administrative and fiscal 
independence from general-purpose local governments. As defined 
for census purposes, the term ‘‘special district governments’’ ex-
cludes school district governments.9 
Special districts are distinguished from more conventional forms of 
government in that they typically serve a “limited purpose” compared 
to the “general purpose” of states, cities, counties, and the like.10 The 
“limited” distinction refers to the fact that most special districts are 
established with a narrower scope of regulatory authority than con-
ventional forms of government.11 To understand why special districts 
have grown in use, a consideration of their history is informative.  
A.   The History of Special Districts 
 The historical development of special districts in the United 
States has consisted of three major chronological phases. First, in the 
early- to mid-1800s, states encountered an increased demand for in-
frastructure improvements because of a more mobile and industrial 
population.12 To address these specific needs without burdening the 
general purpose government, states established special districts and 
gave the districts the authority to issue bonds to pay for the im-
provements.13 This strategy permitted states to increase the spending 
capacity for such projects while avoiding the need to dramatically in-
crease taxes on the overall population.14 
 Unfortunately, some states imbibed in too much of a good thing. 
As one commentator explained, “[t]he profligate creation of special 
districts and issuance of debt were blamed, in part, for the financial 
panic of 1837, which led to the passage of the first limits on state leg-
                                                                                                                     
 8. Sara C. Galvan, Wrestling with MUDS to Pin Down the Truth About Special Dis-
tricts, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 3041, 3043 (2007). 
 9. 1 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, 2002 CENSUS OF 
GOVERNMENTS, INDIVIDUAL STATE DESCRIPTIONS, at vi (2005) [hereinafter INDIVIDUAL 
STATE DESCRIPTIONS], available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2005pubs/gc021x2.pdf. 
 10. See id. 
 11. See id. 
 12. Barbara Coyle McCabe, Special Districts: An Alternative to Consolidation, in CITY-
COUNTY CONSOLIDATION AND ITS ALTERNATIVES 142-43 (Jered B. Carr & Richard C. Feiock 
eds., 2004). 
 13. Id. at 132; see id. at 142-43. One example of this strategy is the series of canals 
throughout the state that the New York Legislature approved after the success of the Erie 
Canal. Id. at 143. Rather than pay for these from the state’s general fund, the Legislature 
created a series of special districts to finance and administer this specific-purpose  
enterprise. Id. 
 14. See id. at 142-43. 
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islative power.”15 These events resulted in decreased use of special 
districts.16 That is, until another financial crisis reversed  
that trend.17 
 As the 1930s began, the Great Depression struck the United 
States with severe economic turmoil. To help counter the effects, 
President Roosevelt, in part, turned back to special districts.18 Roose-
velt viewed these types of entities as an efficient governmental form 
for accomplishing specific tasks.19 As a result, “he promoted the use 
of public authorities and special districts to accomplish many public 
aims”—one of the most significant being the creation of the Tennes-
see Valley Authority, which was essentially an expansive special dis-
trict centered on resource management and services.20 
 By the 1950s, another shift occurred as “the chief proponents of 
special districts began to shift from national leaders to state and lo-
cal executives and private entrepreneurs.”21 This represented a re-
turn to the nineteenth century trend where states viewed special dis-
tricts—and their financing authority—as a tool for large infrastructure 
projects. Former New York Governor Nelson Rockefeller represented a 
prime example of this shift. During his term from 1959 to 1974, the 
Governor established over twenty special district-type entities.22 
 This trend continued into the 1980s as general purpose govern-
ments, faced with reduced federal aid, sought to increase infrastruc-
ture and development capacity without raising taxes or directly going 
into debt.23 To do this, municipalities created a form of special dis-
trict, the business improvement district, to administer and finance 
the revitalization of certain smaller segments within the larger 
city24—a strategy which, again, distributed the cost (and risk) of such 
efforts more narrowly than would the general purpose government 
acting directly on the matter.  
 As the twentieth century passed into the twenty-first century, the 
trend toward creating special districts in the United States contin-
ued. By 2002, the U.S. Census Bureau calculated that there were 
more than 85,000 “governmental units” in the United States.25 
Roughly 38,000 of this total were general purpose forms of local gov-
                                                                                                                     
 15. Id. at 143. 
 16. See id. at 143-44. 
 17. Id. at 144. 
 18. Jerry Mitchell, Public Enterprises in the United States, in PUBLIC ENTERPRISE 
MANAGEMENT: INTERNATIONAL CASE STUDIES 68, 69 (Ali Farazmand ed., 1996). 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. McCabe, supra note 12, at 145.  
 22. Id.  
 23. Id. at 146. 
 24. Id. at 146-47. 
 25. INDIVIDUAL STATE DESCRIPTIONS, supra note 9, at v.  
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ernment.26 The remaining number was comprised of school districts 
and special districts, with special districts numbering slightly more 
than 35,000.27  
 For historical context, the Census Bureau notes that “the number 
of special district governments reported in 2002 [was] almost three 
times the number of special district governments reported in 1952.”28 
This means that, as time goes by, the total number of special dis-
tricts continues to creep near the total of conventional local forms of 
government. This trend indicates that the interest in this special 
form is increasing as an alternative approach to governance. One 
likely reason for this is the flexibility that special districts offer in 
their legal and regulatory operations. 
B.   The Legal Operation of Improvement Districts 
 A common feature among most special districts is their indepen-
dence from existing forms of government.29 As one commentator has 
explained, this means that “the parent government neither serves as 
nor appoints the special district’s governing board.”30 As a result, 
“[s]pecial districts’ work plans and budgets are not subject to the ap-
proval of other local governments.”31 This autonomy and actual legis-
lative capacity elevates a special district from merely an advisory 
board (such as a Board of Zoning Adjustment) to the level of the par-
ent government (such as a City Council) serving in an actual legisla-
tive capacity. 
 Interestingly, though, while the Reedy Creek Improvement Dis-
trict possesses broad powers, the majority of special districts are sin-
gle-purpose in nature.32 The U.S. Census Bureau compiled a list of 
these limited functions—with activities such as fire protection, water 
service, waste management, natural resource management, and 
power generation representing typical examples.33 This finding is 
significant in terms of Reedy Creek constituting an innovative form 
of special district. In particular, the Reedy Creek Improvement Dis-
trict’s innovation is that, while acting as a special district, it eschews 
                                                                                                                     
 26. Id.  
 27. Id. 
 28. 1 U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, 2002 CENSUS OF 
GOVERNMENTS, GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION, at vii (2002), available at 
http://www.census.gov/prod/2003pubs/gc021x1.pdf. This report includes detailed statistical 
analysis comparing general purpose and limited purpose governments within the United 
States. See id. at 4-16. 
 29. McCabe, supra note 12, at 131-32. 
 30. Id. at 132. 
 31. Id. 
 32. INDIVIDUAL STATE DESCRIPTIONS, supra note 9, at vi. 
 33. Id. app. A. 
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the typical singular nature and instead compiles many of these sepa-
rate functions into a larger whole.34 
 The result is a special district with a broad and diverse set of 
powers—the exact equation needed to facilitate what would become 
one of the world’s largest private projects and, in doing so, would 
dramatically alter the face of Florida. The following Parts detail the 
historical origins of the Reedy Creek Improvement District while 
analyzing its legal and regulatory effect. 
III.   THE HISTORY OF DISNEY’S REEDY CREEK  
IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT 
 As one of the country’s most popular tourist destinations, “Walt 
Disney World” is known to almost every American vacationer. Yet, 
this famous Orlando-area destination has not always been known by 
that popular moniker. Indeed, before it was Disney World, the project 
name alternated among a series of names that seemed more like  
code words. 
 For instance, as early as 1964, the resort concept was known as 
Project Winter.35 This was part of a series of other proposed Disney 
projects to be located in St. Louis, Missouri (Project Fall), Niagara 
Falls, New York (Project Summer), and Monterey, California (Project 
Spring).36 These “seasonal” projects were part of a wave of proposed 
Disney projects during the 1960s. While some, like “Riverboat 
Square”—the proposed indoor Disney theme park near the St. Louis 
waterfront—were located in cold weather climates,37 from the begin-
ning, the State of Florida was the most likely location for an expan-
sion of the Disney amusement park enterprise. 
 By June 1965, Disney officials had renamed the proposed resort 
Project Future.38 Shortly thereafter the resort underwent another 
name change with Disney now referring to it as Project Florida,39 
                                                                                                                     
 34. MANNHEIM, supra note 4, at 106-07. 
 35. Economics Research Associates, Preliminary Investigation of Available Acreage for 
Project Winter (Jan. 16, 1964) (unpublished report, on file with the Special Collections and Uni-
versity Archives, University of Central Florida) [hereinafter ERA Preliminary Investigation]. 
 36. Economics Research Associates, Summary of Disney-Oriented Projects (Oct. 18, 
1963) (on file with the Special Collections and University Archives, University of Central 
Florida) [hereinafter ERA Summary of Disney-Oriented Projects]. The company also re-
searched the possibility of locating an East Coast resort in New Jersey. Disneyworld 
Amusement Center with Domed City Set for Florida, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 1967, at 38. 
 37. See FOGLESONG, supra note 1, at 3; JASON SURRELL, THE DISNEY MOUNTAINS: 
IMAGINEERING AT ITS PEAK 60 (2007). 
 38. See Summary of Project Future Seminar (June 14, 1965) (on file with the Special 
Collections and University Archives, University of Central Florida) [hereinafter June 14 
Summary]. This same document also refers to the resort as “Project X” when comparing its 
potential ten-year impact to that of Disneyland. Id. at 3. 
 39. Inter-Office Communication from Jack Sayers to Florida Committee 1 (June 6, 1966) 
(on file with the Special Collections and University Archives, University of Central Florida). 
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Project X,40 and Disneyland-East.41 Ultimately, the company would 
officially announce the project in November 1965,42 with Roy Disney 
finally settling on the name of “Walt Disney World Resort” following 
his brother Walt’s death in December 1966.43 
 The story behind the creation of the Disney Corporation’s massive 
eastern resort is more than just one of name changes. The history of 
the Reedy Creek Improvement District is a tale of unconventional po-
litical and regulatory strategies aimed at securing positive results for 
both public and private interests.  
A.   The Early Planning Years 
 One of the earliest indications of Disney’s interest in a Florida 
resort occurred in the late 1950s.44 Disney commissioned Economics 
Research Associates (ERA) to conduct “A Study of the Market for an 
Eastern Disneyland,” dated June 16, 1959.45 Soon thereafter, rumors 
of a potential Disneyland park in Florida began to spread so ram-
pantly that, by January 1962, several officials organized a meeting to 
brief then Florida Governor Cecil Farris “concerning the establish-
ment of a Disneyland in the State of Florida.”46 While the 1962 meet-
ing was ultimately cancelled,47 Disney’s plans for a Florida resort 
continued forward.48 
 On November 22, 1963, Walt Disney flew over the future Disney 
World site as part of a larger tour of various Florida properties in 
contention for the resort.49 The tour also consisted of stops in St. 
Louis, Niagara Falls, and the Washington D.C. area, where the Dis-
ney entourage toured potential sites and met with proponents of a 
Disney project in their area.50 It was at the end of this lengthy plane 
trip—after the group had stopped in New Orleans and then began 
the flight home to California—that Walt Disney announced to those on 
board the plane that Central Florida appeared to be their location.51 
                                                                                                                     
 40. June 14 Summary, supra note 38, at 3. 
 41. Disneyworld Amusement Center with Domed City Set for Florida, supra note 36.  
 42. FOGLESONG, supra note 1, at 49-51. 
 43. Id. at 64-65. 
 44. Disney Dollars, FORBES MAG., May 1, 1971, at 20 (stating that “Walt and Roy 
[Disney] began plotting out a Disney World in 1958”). 
 45. ERA Summary of Disney-Oriented Projects, supra note 36, at 1.  
 46. Memorandum from James Kynes, Office of the Gov. of Fla. (Jan 1, 1962) (on file 
with Florida State Archives). 
 47. Letter from Fred O. Dickinson, Jr., Chairman, The Florida Council of 100, to 
James Kynes, Office of the Gov. of Fla. (Jan. 10, 1962) (on file with Florida State Archives). 
 48. See Disney Dollars, supra note 44. 
 49. FOGLESONG, supra note 1, at 14. 
 50. Jenkins, supra note 3. 
 51. Id. (“On the quiet return flight to California the next day, [Walt] Disney an-
nounced, simply: ‘Well, that's the place -- Central Florida.’ ”). 
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 With Central Florida now the likely location, the company once 
again hired ERA—this time to research prospective properties for 
Disney World.52 One of the “primary objectives” of this 1964 report 
was “to evaluate in greater detail the location advantages offered by 
Ocala versus Orlando.”53  
 The debate between these locations had started two years earlier 
with another Disney-commissioned ERA report, which concluded 
that “the Ocala area was the optimum geographic location for such a 
project because of the large number of out-of-state visitors . . . that 
passed through or near the city annually.”54  However, by the time 
the 1964 report was finished, two new major highways (the inter-
state between Orlando and Tampa and the extension of the Florida 
Turnpike to Orlando) were nearing completion.55 These new high-
ways meant that Orlando’s drive-through exposure could compete 
with that of Ocala.56 As a result, the ERA report focused more atten-
tion on the Orlando area as it “offer[ed] greater potentials for the de-
velopment of Project Winter than . . . the Ocala area” since “Orlando 
has a large, growing, and healthy economic base to help sustain” a 
project of this magnitude.57 During this time, Thomas DeWolf—a 
Miami attorney whose firm would serve as local counsel—surveyed  
potential locations throughout the state along with others; from the 
trip, the group would identify four possibilities: Port St. Lucie, New 
Smyrna, St. Augustine, and the Orlando area.58 Ultimately, the Pro- 
ject Winter team concurred with ERA and recommended Orlando.59  
 Still, the idea of operating a year-round theme park resort in Cen-
tral Florida was not without potential concerns. Issues such as the 
area’s insect problems, hurricane threats, regular thunderstorms, 
and occasional cold winter days (mixed with a consistently hot and 
humid summer season) meant that the area compared much less fa-
vorably than the more temperate conditions at Disneyland in South-
                                                                                                                     
 52. ERA Preliminary Investigation, supra note 35, at 1.  
 53. Id. The other assigned objectives were: 
(2) to review the present status of the Florida Interstate Highway System and 
what effect the new freeway system is having on tourist travel; (3) to investi-
gate possible locations within the major geographic region described earlier 
which would be suitable for Project Winter; (4) to obtain data on properties cur-
rently available for sale and those that might be potential acquisitions; and (5) 
to determine present land values for these large acreages. 
Id. 
 54. Id. at 2. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. at 5. 
 58. Interview with Thomas DeWolf (Aug. 8, 2007) (on file with author). 
 59. See FOGLESONG, supra note 1, at 37-40. 
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ern California.60 Yet, Disney seemed undeterred and continued for-
ward with Central Florida as its next resort destination.61  
 With the location of Project Winter focused on the Orlando vicini-
ty, the ERA team investigated fifty different properties, with twenty-
five of those researched in detail.62 One of the primary requirements 
was that the accumulated land comprise between 3,000 and 12,000 
acres.63 This led ERA to exclude many parcels located in the western, 
northwestern, and northern parts of the city, as these areas were 
dominated by citrus groves whose value exceeded $4,000 per acre—
much too expensive for accumulating such a large amount of land.64 
 Fortunately, the study found that large, single-owner land hold-
ings and the paths of the new highways made the southern parts of 
Orlando the best option for the project.65 In particular, the report 
identified nine prospective parcels in this area for the development: 
• A 300,000-plus acre parcel controlled by the Mormon Church;66 
• An approximately 6,000-acre parcel near East Tohopekaliga Lake;67 
• A roughly 3,000-acre parcel owned by Major Realty Company—one 
of the largest landholders in Florida;68 
• A 4,550-acre parcel known as the “University Tract” due to its prox-
imity to an even larger parcel that Florida State University was 
considering for a new campus in Orlando;69 
• A 6,000-acre parcel known as the “Highway Hub Tract,” also near 
the proposed university location;70 
• The 6,000-acre Lawson Ranch;71 
• The Acorn River Ranch property located sixteen miles east of  
the city;72 
• An 8,200-acre area known somewhat cryptically as “Parcel  
18”;73 and 
• A 12,440-acre parcel known as the “Expressway Tract.”74 
 The 1964 ERA report analyzed each property with a focus on the 
proximity to highways, per acre cost, topography, size, and number of 
                                                                                                                     
 60. In 1970, a New York Times reporter noted these concerns, together with an ongo-
ing economic slump, as the resort neared completion. Jon Nordheimer, New Disney World 
Is Rising, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 1970, at 27. 
 61. See id. 
 62. ERA Preliminary Investigation, supra note 35, at 11. 
 63. Id. at 12. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. at 12, 14. 
 67. Id. at 14. 
 68. Id. at 17. 
 69. Id. at 18. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 19. 
 72. Id. at 20. 
 73. Id. at 19. 
 74. Id. at 20. 
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owners.75 Eventually, the report would rank the East Tohopekaliga 
Property, the Expressway Tract, the Major Realty Property, and the 
University Tract as the top four options (in that order).76  
 Before compiling the land, though, Disney found itself in the mid-
dle of a whirlwind of legal negotiations cloaked in measures of ex-
treme secrecy, designed to avoid a rash of land speculation.77 
 To shepherd the project from land acquisition to legislative ap-
proval, Disney relied heavily on the Miami-based law firm of Helli-
well, Melrose & DeWolf.78 The firm’s prominent role in the project re-
sulted from peculiar circumstances. Paul Helliwell, namesake of the 
Miami firm, received his law degree prior to joining the United 
States Army during World War II.79 Eventually, Helliwell was as-
signed to the Office of Strategic Services (OSS)80—the U.S. intelli-
gence agency formed during the war as a predecessor to the CIA.81 
During Helliwell’s tenure in the OSS, the agency was headed by 
another lawyer, William Donovan.82 Later, Donovan and Helliwell 
became close,83 and Helliwell was eventually tapped to lead the OSS’s 
intelligence operations in Europe.84 
 Donovan founded the law firm of Donovan, Leisure, Newton & Ir-
vine based in New York.85 When the time came to hire Florida coun-
sel for the effort, Donovan turned to his former OSS associate,  
Paul Helliwell.86 
  Not surprisingly—especially when one considers the intelligence 
backgrounds of both Donovan and Helliwell—the Florida effort soon 
                                                                                                                     
 75. Id. at 14-21. 
 76. Id. at 21. Other parcels were eliminated because of cost (an asking price of $1,650 
per acre for the Highway Hub Tract), topography (extensive swamp property on the Law-
son Ranch), and the lack of proximity to major highways (Acorn River Ranch). Id. at 18-20. 
 77. FOGLESONG, supra note 1, at 35, 40-44. 
 78. MANNHEIM, supra note 4, at 70, 105. 
 79. For an interesting (though somewhat conspiratorially tinged) biography of Paul 
Helliwell, see Spartacus Educational, http://www.spartacus.schoolnet.co.uk/JFKhelliwell.htm 
(last visited Apr. 11, 2009) [hereinafter Spartacus Educational]. 
 80. FOGLESONG, supra note 1, at 44; Spartacus Educational, supra note 79. 
 81. Melody Petersen, Donovan, Leisure, Old-Line Law Firm, to Shut Its Doors, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 20, 1998, http://www.nytimes.com/1998/04/20/business/donovan-leisure-old-
line-law-firm-to-shut-its-doors.html. 
 82. Id.; Spartacus Educational, supra note 79. 
 83. See FOGLESONG, supra note 1, at 40. 
 84. Spartacus Educational, supra note 79. 
 85. Petersen, supra note 81. Disney’s ties with the Donovan firm continued well after 
the Florida project. For instance, former Disney Vice Chairman Sanford M. Litvack once 
served as managing partner for the firm. Litvack Takes New Post, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 
1986, available at http://www.nytimes.com/1986/12/12/business/litvack-takes-new-post.html; 
Sanford “Sandy” M. Litvack, Hogan & Hartson, http://www.hhlaw.com/slitvack (last visited 
Apr. 11, 2009). Joe Shapiro, one of the key Disney attorneys involved in the creation of the 
Disneyland Paris resort, also came to the company from the Donovan firm. See Dana Har-
ris, Dis Lawyer Joe Shapiro Dies, HOLLYWOOD REP., Sept. 27, 1999. 
 86. FOGLESONG, supra note 1, at 40. 
2009]         DISNEY’S REEDY CREEK IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT 187 
 
established policies designed to safeguard the secrecy of the project.87 
For instance, calls between Disney and the Miami firm would gener-
ally be routed through the Donovan firm.88 This reduced the chance 
that an errant message or curious employee might make a direct 
connection between Disney and the land acquisition efforts headed 
by the Helliwell firm. 
B.   The Decisionmaking Period 
 By June 1965, Disney had acquired actual title or options for over 
27,000 acres of land, comprising roughly forty-three square miles.89 
Amazingly, Disney had been able to obtain all of this land for slightly 
more than $5 million90—a figure that worked out to be under $200 
per acre. Title to the property was held by five Florida corporations, 
and the stock for each was owned by a Disney-controlled Delaware 
corporation known as Compass East Corporation.91 Disney estab-
lished the Florida corporations—Reedy Creek Ranch, Inc., Bay Lake 
Properties, Inc., Tomahawk Properties, Inc., Ayefour Corporation, 
and Latin American Development and Management Corporation92—
in an effort to maintain the secrecy of its involvement during the 
purchase process.93  
1.   The Project Future Seminar 
 Following two years of land acquisition, the project entered a new 
phase: the decisionmaking period where the company would, among 
other things, select a corporate and governing strategy for this mas-
sive new development. The week of June 14, 1965, marked a key 
event in this process. During this week, the expanded group of key 
Disney officials convened for a four-day seminar to discuss imple-
mentation strategies related to “Project Future”—the working name 
at the time for the Disney efforts in Florida.94 Officials at the meeting 
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estimated that the overall investment for infrastructure and facilities 
would exceed $100 million.95 
 One major issue related to the importance of Florida counties, as 
this level of government controlled many tax structures. During the 
seminar, Disney officials considered how Orange and Osceola coun-
ties would assess and tax the property during its development stag-
es.96 In particular, the group was keen on having the large undeve-
loped portions of the property classified as agricultural as opposed to 
having the entire property taxed at the higher commercial rates.97 
The effect of this classification was that the counties would refrain 
from assessing taxes based on the prospective value of the property 
as a resort.98  
 Attorney Helliwell also discussed how Florida law treated land as 
unimproved for tax purposes until it reached seventy-five percent 
completion as of January 1st of a given year.99 He suggested that 
county tax authorities would not tax an improvement until that im-
provement was actually used100—an important possibility for a 
phased project like this one where a single improvement might be 
completed but not operational for as long as a year.101 To increase the 
likelihood of these results, Helliwell floated the idea of seeking an 
Attorney General opinion on the issue as such opinions carried sig-
nificant weight in Florida at the time.102 
 Other legal and regulatory issues arose during the seminar: 
• Protection of the Disney trademark within Florida;103 
• The possibility of an involuntary annexation of the project by the 
city of Orlando or another area city;104 
• The liability and tax benefits of establishing Disney’s own  
drainage district;105 
• The applicability of local planning and zoning ordinances to the 
site;106 and 
• The issue of whether the waterways within the property would be 
classified as navigable for control purposes.107 
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 In addition, during the seminar, Walt Disney expressed concern 
that the lack of permanent residents in Orlando would make operat-
ing the Florida resort much different than Disneyland, which had its 
large Los Angeles local population center.108 
 Even more significant was Walt Disney’s strong emphasis on the 
importance of “control[ing] the area, so that it does not become the 
jungle of signs, lights and fly-by-night operations that have ‘fed’ on 
Disneyland’s audience.”109 The theme of “control” would serve as one 
of the leading factors in most decisionmaking related to the project. 
It was during this meeting that Helliwell would make one of the ear-
liest suggestions that Disney should create its own municipality for 
the project so that it could “control [its] own destiny.”110 However, 
Disney officials expressed some concern that creating a city could 
force the company to cede authority to the newly created municipali-
ty.111 In response, Helliwell explained that Disney could form the 
municipality using a special act approved by the State Legisla-
ture112—a strategy that would give the company much more control 
over the municipality’s operating charter.113 Thus, Disney could craft 
specific regulations for its unique circumstances. 
 Considering all of these factors, the municipality idea appeared to 
gain support among the members of the group. In particular, the in-
creased amount of control resonated with them—so much so that it 
was noted that “[i]f a municipality is not formed the controls which 
would otherwise be granted to it would be vested in the county (over 
which we would have no control).”114 
 While the idea of creating a municipality piqued the group’s inter-
est, at least one Disney official suggested that, if established, the ci-
ties should exclude residential properties as this could dilute the 
company’s influence.115 Once again, Helliwell offered a possible legal 
solution: limit voting rights within the municipalities to landown-
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ers.116 This would allow for leased residential units without the com-
pany diluting its control via voting rights. To further the strategy, 
Helliwell pointed to three Florida cases that provided precedent for  
the approach.117 
 Alternatively, meeting participants considered an idea that would 
establish separate municipalities for the proposed residential areas 
and the proposed commercial/amusement components of the 
project.118 This approach would allow the company to include poten-
tially lucrative residential sales in the project without giving the 
prospective residents any control beyond that component.119 
 The meeting attendees set December 1966 as the date for complet-
ing a proposed charter for the cities.120 The charter would address the 
proposed structure for managing the cities as well as the scope of 
power granted to them, with land use, taxation, and bonding authori-
ty being among the company’s chief interests in establishing its  
own city.121 
 Yet, while numerous concerns were identified, the Project Future 
seminar also took on a positive tone in many respects. For instance, 
Helliwell suggested that the project would not need much in the way 
of state legislation122 (a claim that would eventually prove quite pre-
mature) and legislation that it might need would be aided by a posi-
tive political climate for the project123 (a prediction that would, in 
turn, prove extraordinarily accurate). Meanwhile, Disney’s business 
consultant, Roy Hawkins, explained that Florida’s State Develop-
ment Commission would likely be eager to cooperate in making the 
proposal a reality, similar to the support that it had recently pro-
vided for the Pratt-Whitney, General Electric, and Aerojet projects in 
the state.124 Indeed, Hawkins would go so far as to proclaim that, 
from a business development perspective, the “potential is unlimited” 
for Project Future.125 
 The four-day meeting would conclude with the attendees having 
considered a broad spectrum of other issues, including the creation of 
an atomic energy facility, banks, an insurance company, and even an 
                                                                                                                     
 116. Id. at 5. 
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airport for the project—to name just a few.126 Ultimately, the Project 
Future seminar set the stage for Disney’s next legal and regulatory 
steps as it continued to refine strategies for retaining control over 
many aspects of the massive project. Indeed, by the end of the meet-
ing, the official announcement that Disney was coming to Central 
Florida was just months away.   
 During this time, not only would the company engage in creative 
and business planning, but it would also consider another novel go-
vernance strategy—one whose structure had existed for years but 
that had never been tried on such a large scale and with such a large 
scope of authority. 
2.   The Improvement District Strategy 
 In 1965, Florida counties were a powerful governing entity be-
cause of their taxing authority. Yet, Disney officials quickly realized 
that creating their own county would essentially be impossible.127 
Therefore, the company opted to consider an alternative form of go-
vernance. One possibility was to utilize a special district. 
 The special district could represent a win-win for both the compa-
ny and the counties in which the Disney property resided. The com-
pany could retain more control over the project governance than if it 
only created a municipality; meanwhile, Orange and Osceola coun-
ties would avoid the debt involved with installing the massive infra-
structure for the project. 
 Special districts in Florida have a long and varied history. The 
first such districts trace their origins back to the Road, Highway, and 
Ferry Act of 1822, passed by the Territorial Legislature to facilitate 
the construction of transportation routes throughout the wet and 
swampy lands of this southern outpost.128 After Florida became a 
state in 1845, the Legislature passed an act that created Florida’s 
first legislative special district;129 the act foreshadowed the Reedy 
Creek Drainage District as it empowered the financing of wetland 
reclamation through special assessments upon landowners.130 In 
1989, the Florida Legislature passed the Uniform Special District 
Accountability Act of 1989.131 
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3.   Maintaining Legal Control of Reedy Creek 
 While the improvement district approach would provide a novel 
framework for organizing the project, Disney’s desire to control the 
environment competed with the desire to develop the massive land 
holdings. One major problem area involved residential housing.  
 Walt’s original vision for the project included private housing for 
residents of the Florida project. By 1971, this vision began to first 
take shape when the Buena Vista Land Company, a subsidiary of 
Walt Disney Productions, started construction on a 3,800-acre por-
tion of the property that would include private residences such as 
houses, apartments, and townhomes.132 In a 1971 interview, Roy 
Disney explained the rationale for this effort: “This gets us into de-
veloping, building up the lots; from there we gradually move into the 
whole EPCOT idea.”133 
 However, early on, Disney officials realized that private housing 
within the Florida project could dilute their control over the overall 
development.134 If Disney wanted to maintain quality control, the 
company would have to find a way to limit the voting power of the 
private residents.135 This challenge was exacerbated by Avery v. Mid-
land County, a case that was proceeding through the court system at 
this time, which sharply restricted the ability to limit an individual’s 
right to vote based on external factors such as amount of land 
owned.136 In Avery, the Court overturned an electoral process for the 
Midland County Commissioners Court on the grounds that it vi-
olated the Equal Protection Clause.137  The Commissioners Court 
was composed of five members, including a county judge whose vot-
ing power was generally limited to breaking tie votes.138 While the 
judge was elected county-wide, the remaining four regularly-voting 
commissioners were elected from four districts.139 In order to tilt the 
voting power in favor of rural residents, the single urban district in-
cluded over 67,000 of the county’s 70,000 residents while the remain-
ing three districts maintained populations of 828, 852, and 414 resi-
dents.140 Because Midland County centralized over ninety-five per-
cent of the population into a single district, the Court found that the 
county had violated the “one man, one vote principle” associated with 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause in that barely 
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2,000 rural residents would end up electing a majority of the com-
missioners.141 The Court ruled that the Equal Protection Clause re-
quired that local governing bodies “with general governmental pow-
ers over an entire geographic area not be apportioned among single-
member districts of substantially unequal population.”142 
 The Avery Court’s application of the Fourteenth Amendment to a 
local government was an extension of one person, one vote beyond its 
previous limitations to federal and state bodies.143 Local governments 
would now also be required to equally distribute voting powers 
among the local electorate.144 However, the Court was careful to note 
that this was not an absolute requirement for all forms of local go-
verning bodies; indeed, the Court specifically explained that 
[w]ere the Commissioners Court a special-purpose unit of govern-
ment assigned the performance of functions affecting definable 
groups of constituents more than other constituents, we would 
have to confront the question whether such a body may be appor-
tioned in ways which give greater influence to the citizens most af-
fected by the organization’s functions.145 
 This unanswered question placed Disney in a precarious situation 
because the ability to control “voting” within the District was a key 
requirement for the company.146 To do this, Disney intended to limit 
the ability of prospective Reedy Creek residents to participate in the 
governance of the District through voting powers.147 One method for 
accomplishing this goal would be to allocate voting power by land 
ownership.148 With Disney as the predominant land owner, the com-
pany would be able to control votes related to the District. 
 However, in light of the Avery decision, if Disney chose to allow 
individuals to reside within the District or its municipalities, doing 
so could require that the company extend to them voting powers in 
order to comply with the Equal Protection Clause. While the Court 
would ultimately limit the application of the Avery holding in  
the context of certain special districts,149 Disney had no way of know-
ing that this would occur—and, even so, whether the unique struc-
ture of the District could avoid judicial scrutiny under the Four-
teenth Amendment. 
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 However, even with these uncertain issues swirling around this 
unprecedented project, the company’s Florida efforts were about to 
enter a new phase as a local reporter was prepared to break the big 
news: The mystery industry entering Central Florida was none other 
than the Disney Company.150 
C.   The Legal and Legislative Years 
 Soon after rumors of Disney’s involvement in Central Florida were 
confirmed, property values in the area increased at a phenomenal 
rate.151 Before anything could be built, however, Disney had to 
shepherd its regulatory package through the State Legislature.  
1.   The Creation of the Reedy Creek Drainage District 
 Before submitting the legislative package, Disney commenced a 
small, local legal process that would play a disproportionately large 
role in bringing the project to fruition. On May 13, 1966, the Circuit 
Court of the Ninth Judicial District created the Reedy Creek Drai-
nage District pursuant to Chapter 298 of the Florida Statutes.152 This 
allowed Disney to begin the time-consuming effort of draining and 
reclaiming much of the land so that actual site construction would be 
possible. However, this initial legal victory was tempered by growing 
legislative problems—none of which were caused by Disney but each 
of which could conceivably derail the project. 
2.   A Shakeup in the State Legislature 
 On June 22, 1964, the Supreme Court of the United States de-
cided Swann v. Adams; the practical effect of this decision was to re-
quire the Florida Legislature to reapportion the State House and 
State Senate districts.153 The State Legislature responded in the 1965 
legislative session by adopting a new reapportionment plan.154 How-
ever, this solution was short lived as the Supreme Court again over-
turned the plan in 1966.155 
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3.   The Unexpected Death of Walt Disney 
 On December 15, 1966, Walt Disney died, and the impact of his 
death would stress the creative bearings of the entire project.156 After 
all, he had been the strategic and inspirational leader for not just the 
effort to build another theme park, but to craft an entire “City  
of Tomorrow.”157 
 After an intense period of evaluation, Roy Disney took over the 
company’s decisionmaking and quickly resolved that the project 
would go forward.158 As biographer Bob Thomas recounts, Roy ga-
thered the company’s major executives and insisted that the Florida 
project continue: “We’re going to finish this park, and we’re going to 
do it just the way Walt wanted it. Don’t you ever forget it. I want 
every one of you to do just exactly what you were going to do when 
Walt was alive.”159 
4.   The Creation of the Reedy Creek Improvement District and Its 
Two Cities 
 The Governor signed three pieces of legislation that represented 
the privatization of many traditional local regulatory responsibilities. 
Each piece of legislation, in its own respect, enabled Walt Disney’s 
dream to become reality. 
(a)   Chapter 67-784: Creating the Reedy Creek Improvement 
District 
 The legislation creating the actual Reedy Creek Improvement Dis-
trict exceeds a hefty one hundred pages in length.160 However, even 
more impressive than the length is the scope of the District’s authority. 
 In a technical sense, to create the improvement district, the Flori-
da Legislature essentially codified the May 13, 1966, circuit court de-
cree that established the Reedy Creek Drainage District and then 
expanded the scope of the District’s authority.161 Section 9 of the leg-
islation sets forth the various powers of the District—a wide-ranging 
grant of authority that included typical tasks such as the right to 
own property and maintain a corporate seal and expansive powers 
such as extraterritorial eminent domain.162 Other powers granted to 
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the District included many that were typically held by a municipali-
ty: land reclamation, water and flood control, waste collection and 
disposal, pest control, fire protection, issuance of bonds, land use,163 
and building regulations.164 
 In several cases, the legislation empowered the District to engage 
in less typical acts such as operating an airport and heliport (for both 
passenger and freight service).165 On October 17, 1971, the resort de-
buted one of the country’s first short-length airstrips (known as a 
STOLport for Short Take-Off and Landing).166 During its operation, 
two airlines, Shawnee and Executive, operated passenger flights 
from the main airports in Orlando and Tampa directly to Disney 
World on small passenger turbo-prop planes.167 The resort also main-
tained an Ultralight Flightpark near Epcot Center for private pur-
poses.168 While these landing strips were eventually abandoned,169 at 
least one helipad remains in the nonpublic area of Epcot near the 
Living Seas Pavilion—a continuing legacy of the original  
1967 legislation. 
 One of the recurrent themes within this legislation was to grant 
the District broad powers for experimental technologies. For in-
stance, when the Legislature provided the District with authority to 
operate transportation systems, the statutory language contemplated 
systems “whether now or hereafter invented or developed including 
without limitation novel and experimental facilities.”170 Similarly, the 
legislation authorized the District to operate “new and experimental 
public utilities” and “new and experimental sources of power and 
energy.”171 In fact, the goal of enabling the District to govern outside 
conventional norms was further demonstrated by a separate section 
within the legislation directly on point: 
[I]n order to promote the development and utilization of new con-
cepts, designs and ideas in the fields of recreation and community 
living, the District shall have the power and authority to examine 
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into, develop and utilize new concepts, designs and ideas, and to 
own, acquire, construct, reconstruct, equip, operate, maintain, ex-
tend and improve such experimental public facilities and servic-
es . . . as the Board may from time to time determine.172 
 Clearly, both the Legislature and Disney conceived a project that, 
while in many respects operated as a conventional municipality, also 
possessed a broad scope of enabling authority to approach gover-
nance from a more novel perspective. This was the very type of au-
thority that Walt Disney himself had anticipated would be necessary 
in order to accomplish such a unique project.173 
 For governing purposes, the legislation created a five-person 
Board of Supervisors, all of whom had to own land within the District 
and a majority of which had to be residents of Osceola, Orange, or an 
adjoining county.174 To elect the Board, the legislation provided that 
“each landowner shall be entitled to one (1) vote in person or by writ-
ten proxy for every acre of land and for every major fraction of an 
acre owned by him in the District.”175 This interesting provision 
meant that prospective, nonlandowner residents of the District (such 
as renters) or landowners owning less than one-half acre would not 
be entitled to vote in Board elections. 
(b)   The Legislation Creating the City of Reedy Creek and the City 
of Bay Lake 
 In addition to establishing the Reedy Creek “Super District,” Dis-
ney also received legislative approval for two new municipalities 
within the District, the City of Bay Lake176 and the City of Reedy 
Creek.177 A review of this legislation reveals a grant of somewhat typ-
ical municipal powers. What is atypical, however, is the fact that 
Disney essentially controlled the governance of both cities by limiting 
their populations to small groups of Disney employees and their fam-
ilies.178 Essentially, the cities operated much like the District—as a 
regulatory tool for governing the Florida project. Indeed, many of the 
                                                                                                                     
 172. Id. § 9(20), 1967 Fla. Laws at 296. 
 173. See generally MANNHEIM, supra note 4, at 105-25. 
 174. Ch. 67-764, § 4(1), 1967 Fla. Laws at 284. 
 175. Id. § 4(5), 1967 Fla. Laws at 285. 
 176. The City of Bay Lake was established on May 12, 1967, by Chapter 67-1104 of the 
Florida Special Acts. Act effective May 12, 1967, ch. 67-1104, pmbl., 1967 Fla. Laws 200, 
200. A review of Google Maps aerial imagery to scale shows that residents of Bay Lake 
maintain the distinction of living within two miles of Disney’s Magic Kingdom park—an 
address that many Disney fans can only dream about. 
 177. The City of Reedy Creek was established on May 12, 1967, by Chapter 67-1965 of 
the Florida Special Acts. Act effective May 12, 1967, ch. 67-1965, pmbl., 1967 Fla. Laws 
3769, 3769. 
 178. FOGLESONG, supra note 1, at 6. 
198  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 36:177 
 
powers held by the District were concurrently held by the  
two municipalities.179 
 However, there were several interesting exceptions to this general 
rule, with the cities possessing some powers that the District did not. 
These included the following: 
• Authority to issue business and professional licenses as well as col-
lect related fees;180 
• Authority to build and maintain health care facilities, including 
hospitals and health care research facilities;181 
• Authority to provide police services;182 
• Authority to regulate the manufacturing and sale of alcohol;183 and 
• Authority to establish and operate a municipal court, including ap-
pointment of a municipal judge and city prosecutor.184 
 Indeed, in Sipkema v. Reedy Creek Improvement District, the Flor-
ida Fifth District Court of Appeal indicated that the District did not 
directly possess law enforcement authority.185 However, even though 
the Legislature did not provide the District directly with these pow-
ers, both the city legislation and the District’s legislation provided for 
a system where the cities could provide these services within the un-
incorporated areas of the District upon agreement of the entities.186 
The effect of the arrangement was that, since the company controlled 
all of the entities, it maintained the power to provide police services, 
hospital services, municipal court services, and the like within the 
entire boundaries of the District. 
 And, though the District has not elected to offer some of these ser-
vices (such as operating a police force187 or municipal court system188), 
the 1967 legislative package nevertheless reserved almost all local 
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governance responsibilities for either the cities or the District.189 The 
uniquely broad scope of this authority was soon tested within the Flor-
ida courts to determine whether the District and the cities, novel as 
they were, comported with the requirements of Florida’s Constitution.190 
5.   A Legal Challenge to Disney’s New Improvement District 
 By November 1968, the project had encountered the threshold le-
gal challenge of whether the Florida Supreme Court would uphold 
the constitutionality of this unique privatization of governance. The 
case, State v. Reedy Creek Improvement District,191 centered on the 
propriety of allowing the District to issue drainage bonds as part of 
the overall project development.192 The bond revenue would be used 
to drain and reclaim submerged land within the District, and the 
bond maturity dates ranged from 1970 until 2004.193 
 The matter represented a somewhat odd procedural situation as 
the State, which had previously created the District through the 
1967 legislation, was challenging the very scope of authority that it 
had granted to the District. The exercise was an important one, 
though, because it provided an opportunity for all parties to essen-
tially test the legality of the District’s unique structure within the 
Florida courts. Indeed, according to DeWolf, the lawsuit did not 
represent an effort by the State to overturn the Legislature’s crea-
tion; rather it was a vehicle by which Disney could bring legal finali-
ty to whether the District would remain.194 
 Ultimately, the Florida Supreme Court upheld not only the trial 
court’s validation of the drainage bonds, but also the very structure 
of the District itself.195 In doing so, the Court found the State’s chal-
lenge to the validity of the bonds to be “untenable.”196 
 For instance, it disposed of the State’s first argument that the 
bonds represented an unlawful issuance of public funds for a private 
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purpose by noting that “the promotion and development of tourism 
and recreation” serve as “valid public purposes” as determined both 
by the State Legislature and affirmed by numerous Florida cases: 
Successful completion and operation of the District no doubt will 
greatly aid the Disney interest and its contemplated Disneyworld 
project. However, it is obvious that to a lesser degree the contem-
plated benefits of the District will inure to numerous inhabitants 
of the District in addition to persons in the Disney complex.197 
 The duality of this benefit persuaded the court that the bond is-
suance would attain the level of advancing a general public purpose 
within the state.198 Of course, one might note that the court’s holding 
appeared to be based in part on “inhabitants” ultimately residing in 
the District.199 And, while even today, that does occur as discussed 
herein, Disney’s plans for an extensive residential component  
never materialized. 
 Would that have altered the court’s opinion had it known this? 
Obviously, any proposed answer is simply founded on speculation. 
However, in this instance, the court’s emphasis on the project’s ex-
tensive tourism benefits would seem to indicate that—even without 
residents—the District’s activities would have risen to the level of a 
“public purpose.” Indeed, the court itself noted that “the integrated 
plan or workings of the District . . . are essentially and primarily di-
rected toward encouraging and developing tourism” for both resi-
dents and nonresidents of the state.200 
 This is significant as Florida law has consistently held that a 
“public purpose”201 may still result even if a private entity has rea-
lized a distinct benefit.202 Generally, courts have held that the private 
benefit should be only “incidental” in scope.203 Exactly when the “in-
cidental” threshold is cleared does not lend itself to a bright-line rule. 
For instance, the Florida Supreme Court held that issuing industrial 
bonds worth $9 million for purchasing land and constructing a pri-
vate television station violated this threshold.204 The court held this 
to be the case if “the benefits to a private party are themselves the 
                                                                                                                     
 197. Id. 
 198. Id. at 205-06. 
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paramount purpose of a project, then the bonds will not be validated 
even if the public gains something therefrom.”205 
 Florida law seems to be especially lenient when considering “pub-
lic purpose” issues related to tourism and entertainment matters,206 
which is not surprising considering the significant role that these in-
dustries play in the state’s overall economy. As a result, the court’s 
expansive definition in Reedy Creek hardly fell outside the norm of 
both past and future jurisprudence on the issue. 
 Next, the court dealt with the State’s threshold argument which 
was that the District’s enabling act was a “mere subterfuge” to avoid 
creating a new municipality.207 The gist of this contention was that 
the creation of a unique “multi-county, multi-purpose special im-
provement district with numerous and diverse powers” violated the 
Florida Constitution.208 The court appeared to agree that the District 
was a unique vehicle for governing;209 however, uniqueness alone is 
not a fatal flaw as long as it does not violate constitutional parame-
ters.210 The court concluded that it did not violate the Florida Consti-
tution, noting that “[s]o long as specific constitutional provisions are 
not offended, the Legislature in the exercise of its plenary authority 
may create a special improvement district encompassing more than 
one county and possessing multi-purpose powers essential to the rea-
lization of a valid public purpose.”211 
 Finally, the court disposed of several arguments related to the 
technical nature of how the District was created and the scope of its 
authority, and in each instance it found the State’s arguments un-
persuasive.212 With that, the legality of the Legislature’s experiment 
in bestowing public governance powers upon a private entity was af-
firmed. This holding validated the years of legal and regulatory 
planning that ultimately produced the Reedy Creek Improvement 
District. The legality of Disney’s expansive, multipurpose special dis-
trict was now official. 
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IV.   THE RATIONALE FOR ESTABLISHING THE REEDY CREEK 
IMPROVEMENT DISTRICT 
“The big difference between [Disney World] and Disneyland in Cali-
fornia is that this is a real estate venture for us. The amusement park 
is just a catalyst that will draw other investments here.” 
— Roy Disney (1970)213 
 Disney could have created amusement parks and an innovative 
mixed-use development without resorting to court-approved drainage 
districts and newly-enabled cities and improvement districts, but it 
chose not to do so. This leads to an important question: Why opt for 
such a complex and novel approach toward developing the Florida 
project when other large private developments (including Disneyland) 
succeeded without such a unique regulatory framework? 
 The answer is multifaceted and complex, but it clearly centers on 
the issue of legal control over the physical and regulatory environ-
ment that would shape the massive project. Unfortunately, the term 
“control,” especially in a land development context, can cause a vis-
ceral reaction centered on the idea of a Big Brother-like entity wildly 
exercising suppressive powers. And, even in cases with less of a reac-
tion, the idea of assigning governing powers to a private entity may 
give some pause. 
 Increased private control over governance is not itself an inherent 
danger. Rather, it is the granting of that control to a potentially ab-
usive entity that can result in problems. In the case of Disney in the 
1960s, the Florida Legislature had little reason to question the mo-
tives of the company’s request. In fact, Disney’s reasoning for the re-
quest demonstrated otherwise: it sought private powers not to govern 
and enforce its will on other landowners, but instead to strictly limit 
this governance to its own land holdings. For instance, when it de-
veloped Disneyland, the company failed to acquire much of the sur-
rounding land. The result was that, as the project became popular, a 
slew of cheap motels and shops built up around the theme park.214 
This created a visual blight, which was an especially troubling prob-
lem because Disney invested so much into the appearance  
of Disneyland.215 
 Therefore, it was hardly surprising that Disney feared a similar 
result in Florida if the project was developed without the buffer Dis-
neyland lacked. Indeed, this fear would turn out to be well-founded 
as the Florida project would soon be surrounded by less immersive 
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commercial developments, as motels, hotels, and other retail estab-
lishments “rac[ed] against the clock” to acquire land and build.216 The 
difference in Florida was that the company had enough buffer land to 
keep these businesses away from its project. 
 While the buffer alone might have been sufficient to keep away 
undesirable businesses, it alone did not empower Disney to make fi-
nal development decisions related to the property. Were Disney to 
have proceeded under the existing structures of governance, those 
decisions would have remained in the hands of county commission-
ers, building departments, fire chiefs, and other regulators. The net 
effect of this would be to saddle Disney’s progressive visions of new 
building techniques, water management, and land uses with the de-
cidedly conventional regulations of what were, at the time, relatively 
underdeveloped counties in Central Florida.217 Quite simply, it is un-
likely that the existing counties would have had the personnel and 
financial resources to govern such a massive and complex project. 
 Another factor in the issue of control was that Walt Disney 
reached his creative and most influential apex at the very same time 
that disorder was disrupting American cities.218 This was a time of 
urban upheaval and distress, with riots and crime disrupting the na-
tion.219 Walt Disney seemed intent on countering these problems.220 
 Rather than seeking to impose order on existing institutions, Walt 
Disney sought to create new institutions to further this goal.221 In 
doing so, Disney implicitly recognized that the national flux of the 
1960s was not something he had to destroy. He did not seem intent 
to force his ideals on the public as a whole. Rather, he sought in-
creased control over a project that would never have existed but for 
his investment in the effort. The result was the multibillion dollar 
Reedy Creek project. 
V.   THE POSITIVE IMPACT OF THE REEDY CREEK IMPROVEMENT 
DISTRICT ON STATE AND LOCAL INTERESTS 
 The improvement district format furthered Disney’s efforts to 
maintain control over many governance aspects of the project. How-
ever, the appropriateness of this approach is obviously not measured 
merely by how it benefits the private corporation. Since it acquired 
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many of the regulatory powers that the counties would have other-
wise maintained, a complete analysis of the Reedy Creek Improve-
ment District also requires consideration of how the District affected 
state and local interests. 
 The Florida Legislature’s decision to create the District demon-
strated a willingness to engage in novel regulatory strategies in or-
der to secure the Disney project. This leads to another important 
question: Was the Legislature’s decision to privatize much of the go-
verning authority within Reedy Creek a wise one? 
 To fully answer that question, one must first consider the state of 
rural Orange and Osceola counties prior to Disney’s Florida project. 
This provides context to the massive change that the project would 
bring. The first key issue is whether the large-scale development of 
this area was inevitable or whether it was uniquely provoked by the 
Disney effort. If the answer is the former, then Disney’s effect on the 
region is not nearly as significant as if the latter were true; if Disney 
did not develop, it would have been someone else. However, if the an-
swer is the latter—that the development was uniquely provoked by 
Disney—then there is little doubt that the Disney project caused a 
massive change in this area that otherwise would not have occurred. 
According to one commentator, the latter answer is the much more 
plausible one: 
Try to imagine a swath of our state that had more citrus trees than 
people, more marsh than development, more cattle pasture than 
parking lot. In 1965 itwas [sic] that way. And hardly anyone was 
envisioning much other than more of the same for Orange and Os-
ceola counties. 
That area had fewer than 370,000 residents then, and they were 
making their unremarkable living mainly from the land -- raising 
cattle, growing oranges, building small subdivisions. A few folks 
were selling pecan logs and painted coconut heads to the tourists 
passing on their way to beaches east and west. Maybe those visi-
tors would detour to play golf or take photos of the water-skiing 
acts and lovely flowers at Cypress Gardens. But they didn’t have 
much reason to make Orlando their destination. 
True, lots of folks were continuing the trend, begun after World 
War II, of moving to Florida for jobs or retirement. But the dull, 
flat landscape of Central Florida lacked the allure of its  
coastline.222 
 Of course, the mere fact that the endeavor brought significant 
change of an unanticipated scale does not necessarily mean that the 
region and state benefited from the change. However, in this  
instance, both historical and contemporary research reveals that  
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the Disney effort would serve as a boon to both the state and  
local economies. 
A.   The 1967 ERA Report 
 In 1965, the East Central Florida Regional Planning Council, 
which included both Orange and Osceola counties, produced a de-
tailed report on the regional economy and development.223 The report 
outlined some seemingly incongruous results. For instance, while it 
touted that between 1950 and 1963 the region’s economy “underwent 
one of the most rapid and drastic changes ever to take place in a U. 
S. region in peacetime,”224 the report also noted that the region  
“contributed significantly” to Florida’s overall nation-leading mort-
gage defaults.225 
 The fact that the Council offered its analysis for this robustly con-
flicted economy in May 1965 is interesting in that, though little 
known to the Council, one of the largest economic forces ever to 
shape the region was just months from being officially announced. 
Indeed, the November 1965 announcement of Disney’s Florida  
project would add a significant new variable to the area’s economy 
and development. 
 To help quantify this variable, a Disney-commissioned study from 
ERA in January 1967 focused on the prospective economic impact 
that the Disney project would generate for the state and Central 
Florida.226 The report concluded that, from the start of construction 
through the first decade of operation, the project would generate 
more than $6.6 billion in “new wealth.”227 In particular, the report es-
timated new visitor expenditures exceeding $3.9 billion, new payrolls 
reaching $2.2 billion, and more than $400 million in construction-
related expenditures.228 
 The study also estimated that the state government would realize 
$243 million in sales tax receipts from new visitors and new resi-
dents resulting from the project, while local governments would ob-
tain more than $100 million in additional tax revenues.229 Ultimate-
ly, the report concluded that the estimated 19.5 million additional 
visitors coming to the Disney project in the first ten years would 
make a significant impact on the entire state.230 
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 The clear result was that ERA anticipated a major net gain for 
both the state and local governments and an opportunity for Florida 
to define itself more broadly in terms of tourist attractions. For in-
stance, according to the ERA Report, “In 1965 only 8 percent of all 
activities which visitors looked forward to on a trip to Florida con-
sisted of commercial attractions.”231 This low number likely resulted 
from the state’s primary attraction as a destination for beach vaca-
tions. Adding a nonbeach tourist option of Disney’s magnitude would 
provide a compelling reason to visit Florida for those vacationers not 
interested in a beach trip.232 
 The extension of these benefits to the local communities and the 
state as a whole was seconded by those such as the East Central 
Florida Regional Planning Council, which subsequently predicted 
that, because of the project, “there would be a $500-million invest-
ment in tourist-related activities outside of Disney World by 1980 
and a need for 27,000 more hotel and motel rooms, and 70,000 new 
jobs. We see all this investment transforming tourism in Florida.”233  
 Moreover, the announcement of the project increased area land 
values more than thirty percent.234 Even before construction was 
completed, all of the Disney World convention dates for 1972 (the 
first year that on-property conventions would start in earnest) were 
booked in advance,235 which was yet another indication that ERA’s 
prediction of Disney’s economic success was well supported. 
 Indeed, by 1972, Disney World’s first full year of operation, the 
area’s unemployment rate was two percent lower than the national 
average and the area’s tax receipts, construction projects, and bank 
deposits had reached all-time highs.236 Clearly, the massive Disney 
project was bearing fruit for the region. 
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B.   The 1983 Disney World Effect Study 
 The early positive effects of the project would be revisited a dec-
ade later in another economic impact study. In particular, the Or-
lando-located Rollins College produced a 1983 study entitled “The 
Disney World Effect,” which used statistical data to analyze the im-
pact of the resort on the State of Florida.237 The report used govern-
ment statistics to reach several important conclusions related to the 
time period from 1970 to 1980, roughly the first decade of Disney 
World’s operation: 
• In 1980, the United States population growth rate was 11% while 
Florida’s rate was 43.55%, and the three county area surrounding 
Disney World was even higher at 54.45%.238  
• From 1970 to 1980, the wage level for the three county area de-
creased by 6% while the wage level for Florida decreased by 3.5% 
and the national average decreased by 0.62%—though the study 
found that service industry per capita income increased for this pe-
riod.239 Moreover, overall employment in the region expanded with a 
shift from manufacturing jobs to more service industry positions.240 
Air transportation also dramatically grew with an increase greater 
than 2,000%.241 This led the study to conclude that “[w]hile individ-
uals [sic] real incomes have fallen for the central Florida area, pro-
duction has still greatly increased. This is evident by the sharp in-
crease in newly established industrial units, total employee payrolls, 
and the number of employees.”242 
• The travel patterns of vacationers to Florida had changed dramati-
cally. Whereas many once traveled to Florida for its beaches, by the 
1980s, Disney World accounted for roughly 40% of Florida vacation-
ers.243 The counties of Orange and Osceola received the lion’s share 
of these new guests as their tourist arrivals from 1970 to 1981 in-
creased 648.3% while statewide the increase was 46.1%.244 
• With the increase in tourists came increased spending. Indeed, dur-
ing this time period, the entire state realized a 141.6% growth in ex-
penditures while the three-county Orlando area experienced a 
188.8% increase.245 
• State expenditures in response to the growth varied widely with 
education spending increasing while highway spending lagged be-
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hind.246 “[T]he state of Florida, with priority placed on public protec-
tion, has tried to maintain the quality of life, without great expense 
to the taxpayer.”247 
 Ultimately, the study concluded the following: 
The development of Disney World has served as a learning aid for 
the central Florida area, illustrating how radically the establish-
ment of one industry can change an area’s growth, and also, how 
important effective community planning is. The area has suc-
ceeded in dealing with the rapid changes and has thus served, 
with Disney World, to enhance Florida’s attractiveness as a vaca-
tion destination for tourists, while maintaining the quality of liv-
ing for the growing number of Florida residents.248 
 From the 1983 study, it became increasingly clear that ten years 
after Disney World opened to the public, both Florida and the Orlan-
do metro area were realizing the positive impacts projected in the 
1967 ERA study. That is, of course, not to say that negative impacts 
did not exist. Indeed, the aforementioned transportation problem 
highlighted just the opposite. However, those negative effects contin-
ued to be outweighed by positive effects as the project wrapped up its 
first decade of operation. 
 Nearly twenty years later, another economic impact study con-
cluded that the state and region were still realizing positive impacts 
from the unique Disney World and Reedy Creek structure.  
C.   The 2004 Fishkind Study 
 In 2004, a study by Dr. Hank Fishkind & Associates concluded 
that Reedy Creek and the resort continued to generate positive eco-
nomic results.249 The report included a finding that the company’s 
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annual $5.1 billion gross fiscal output in Central Florida equaled 
more than 8% of the region’s total output.250 The report also found 
that the company maintained a $1.3 billion annual payroll while it 
fostered over $1.5 billion in other direct and indirect payroll earnings 
for workers in the region.251 Ultimately, the study concluded  
the following: 
All of these economic activities, combined with Guest and 
employee spending locally, provide a huge fiscal surplus of $350 
million annually - $295 million per year in Orange County; $52 
million per year in Osceola County; and more than $1 million per 
year in Brevard County. These surpluses result in a major 
reduction in the per year tax burden that residents otherwise 
would be compelled to pay for services.252 
In fact, if not for the tourism generated by Disney, households in 
Central Florida would pay $476 more in local taxes each year.253 
 The result was that, over the course of three decades, Disney 
World continued to provide direct and indirect benefits to the local 
and state economies in a proportion that easily outweighed its nega-
tive impacts. 
D.   Other Economic Impacts of Reedy Creek 
 Beyond specific studies and reports, the Reedy Creek project has 
also benefited the Orlando metropolitan area in other ways. Indeed, 
as early as 1970, “Disney World spawn[ed] a need for business and 
financial services” in greater Orlando.254 This included large new 
bank branches, financial service institutions, and insurance 
interests, such as a new nineteen story building for CNA Financial 
Corporation and a $4.5 million headquarters for The Hartford 
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Insurance Group.255 The benefits derived from the creation of the Dis-
trict were not limited to only financial matters, though. 
E.   Noneconomic Impacts of Reedy Creek 
 One complaint about Reedy Creek is that its approach to devel-
opment harmed the environment.256 Most of the criticism centers on 
Disney World’s effect on the existing ecosystem, and particular con-
cern is directed toward Disney’s treatment of wetlands.257 
 An independent case study concluded that the environmental 
management systems for Disney World and Reedy Creek were  
effectively managed and operated.258 Indeed, both facilities earned 
awards for extensive environmental accomplishments in a wide 
range of areas, including natural resource management, pest control, 
water and energy conversation, and recycling.259 Moreover, multiple 
Disney hotels within the District also received the Florida Depart-
ment of Environmental Protection’s “Green Lodging Certification,” a 
voluntary state program designed to “encourag[e] hotels and motels 
to adopt cost-saving ‘green’ practices that reduce waste and conserve 
natural resources.”260 
 Despite the unique structure of Reedy Creek, Disney World con-
tinues to comply with, if not exceed, environmental practices.261 This 
is a strong indication that the public-private dichotomy at work in 
the District has not led to standards lower than if Disney World were 
regulated under a more traditional form of governance. This may be 
due to extensive federal, regional, and state environmental regula-
tion from authorities such as the Army Corps of Engineers, U.S. Fish 
and Wildlife Service, Florida Department of Environmental Protec-
tion, and the South Florida Water Management District.262  
 In the mid-1960s, Disney entered into a U.S. Geological Survey 
cooperative program designed “to monitor the quantity and quality of 
surface and ground water in and adjacent to the [District] as an aid 
in the continuing management of the [District]’s water resources, 
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and in evaluating the effects of urban activities on the hydrologic 
system.”263 The effect is that the environmental practices within the 
District have historically been regulated by a wide variety of state 
and federal agencies in addition to internal District regulations. 
 Moreover, as early as 1971, the National Wildlife Federation rec-
ognized that the Reedy Creek project “contains many innovations de-
signed to solve a host of current environmental problems.”264 These 
included the following: 
• Seventeen dams and an extensive dike system to protect the 
project’s conservation area;265 
• A compressed-air trash removal system that delivered trash to a 
central management area;266 
• A storm water and waste water system developed in conjunction 
with University of Florida experts designed to “render sewage harm-
less and even profitable”;267 
• Power generation techniques designed to reduce thermal pollu-
tion;268 and 
• Alternative pest control methods designed to limit the use of certain 
chemicals.269 
These efforts led the group to conclude that “Walt Disney’s succes-
sors have done just about everything that time, talent, good will and 
money can provide to nurture the high hopes their late boss had for 
Disney World.”270 
 Of course, this is not to say that environmental concerns were 
nonexistent. Indeed, at the time, several specific concerns included 
increases in traffic, loss of plant life, and negative impacts upon area 
citrus groves and the water supply.271 However, while the develop-
ment has certainly affected the area (if for no other reason than due 
to its sheer size), the resulting impact has not generated the negative 
impacts predicted by some.  
 This is especially true when one considers that the most realized 
problem, increased traffic congestion, may have been affected by the 
Florida project but was also in part attributable to interstate, turn-
pike, and other road construction planned before the project. The 
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planned road network is one of the reasons the company selected  
the site.272 
 Those who propose that Florida erred in creating the Reedy Creek 
Improvement District because of negative environmental impacts 
lack a persuasive body of facts in support of this argument. More-
over, the proposition ignores the reality that Reedy Creek remains 
regulated by state, regional, and federal environmental agencies. 
Thus, to whatever extent the Reedy Creek format privatized some lo-
cal legislative functions, those functions did not include environ-
mental oversight.  
F.   Opportunities to Repeal the District’s Regulatory Powers 
 One final note remains pertinent to this discussion: had the Flori-
da State Legislature believed that the District was not governing in 
an effective manner, it could have repealed the District’s authority at 
any time and reassigned it to existing public governance entities like 
Orange and Osceola counties. Indeed, in several instances, the State 
Legislature chose to do the exact opposite—that is, to specifically ex-
empt the District from additional governance by those local general-
purpose bodies. 
 For example, when the State Legislature passed a law that pro-
vided that “[e]ach independent special district shall submit to each 
local general-purpose government in which it is located a public facil-
ities report and an annual notice of any changes,”273 it specifically ex-
cluded the District from this requirement.274 Similarly, when the 
State Legislature passed a law requiring local governments to pre-
pare comprehensive plans for future growth and development,275 ra-
ther than give Orange and Osceola counties authority over property 
within the District, the Legislature assigned this responsibility di-
rectly to the District “for the total area under its jurisdiction.”276 
 A cynical observer may suggest that these exceptions resulted 
from Disney’s strong lobbying power within the state, but there is no 
evidence that any untoward influence was ever exerted to obtain 
these provisions. The reality is that, when confronted with subse-
quent opportunities to reduce or expand the scope of the District’s 
governance authority, the State Legislature opted for the latter. 
 The Legislature evidenced its attention to the District’s unique 
governance authority when, in February 2004, the Comcast Corpora-
tion commenced efforts to acquire Disney, including its Florida prop-
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erties.277 While Comcast’s efforts were ultimately unsuccessful, the 
State Legislature commissioned a report on the effects of a change  
in ownership.278 
 The December 2004 report by the State’s Office of Program Policy 
Analysis & Government Accountability (OPPAGA) concluded that “in 
general, current accountability mechanisms are sufficient to ensure 
that if primary landownership changed, [the District] would continue 
to meet the public purpose expressed in its special act and in other 
legislation.”279 This conclusion followed a review of the District’s ex-
isting laws and regulations as well as consideration that the District 
was also subject to additional layers of governance by a variety of 
other state and federal agencies.280 Ranging from the U.S. Environ-
mental Protection Agency to the South Florida Water Management 
District, the report determined that “[t]hese agencies provide moni-
toring and enforcement mechanisms that would tend to discourage 
and prevent a new primary landowner from violating federal and 
state law and/or making rapid or major changes in district operations 
and services.”281 
 In addition, the report catalogued not only the agencies that the 
District must report to, but also the nearly twenty interlocal govern-
mental agreements that the District has entered into with either 
Orange or Osceola County.282 Finally, even though it concluded that 
sufficient safeguards existed, the report identified two primary statu-
tory changes that the Legislature could implement to enhance these 
safeguards.283 These involved providing further criteria for prevent-
ing the District’s board members from being replaced by a new owner 
without cause and placing the District within the state’s regional 
growth management program.284 
 In the end, even though it was presented with these specific pro-
posals, the State Legislature did not choose to implement them. This 
means that, although presented with a mechanism to repeal or re-
strict the District’s authority, the State Legislature did not elect to 
do so. This is significant as it is very reasonable to believe that, if 
the original experiment of assigning traditional public governance 
authority to the Reedy Creek “Super District” had not achieved sta-
bility and success over its thirty-plus years, the State Legislature 
would have intervened and ended this unique situation. The fact that 
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the Legislature did not do so strongly endorses the overall propriety 
of the District’s regulatory structure. 
VI.   CONCLUSION 
 Little known to the millions of guests who visit the Walt Disney 
World Resort each year, the Reedy Creek Improvement District  
is the engine that has driven this wildly successful project from  
an idea in Walt Disney’s mind to one of the world’s largest develop-
ment projects. 
 In the process, novel ideas—legal, engineering, legislative, and 
many others—enabled an effort of this scope to develop. Naturally, 
innovation, which by its very nature invokes the unknown, generated 
questions and concern among those who had come to rely upon a 
well-established framework. Yet, those questions have, by and large, 
been based on concerns not founded on quantitative problems, but 
rather speculative anxiety. Indeed, more than providing a regulatory 
framework for a theme park resort, the Reedy Creek Improvement 
District has demonstrated that unique allocations of public and pri-
vate governance can promote visionary efforts.  
 This is the lesson—and the story—of the Reedy Creek Improve-
ment District. 
